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Abstract 
Animal experiments are widely required to comply with the 3Rs, to minimise harm to the animals 
and to serve certain purposes in order to be ethically acceptable. Recently, however, there has been a 
drift towards adding a so-called harm-benefit analysis as an additional requirement in assessing 
experiments. According to this, an experiment should only be allowed if there is a positive balance 
when the expected harm is weighed against the expected benefits. This paper aims to assess the added 
value of this requirement. Two models, the discourse and the metric model, are presented. According 
to the former, the weighing of harms and benefits must be conducted by a committee in which 
different stakeholders engage in a dialogue. Research into how this works in practice, however, shows 
that in the absence of an explicit and clearly defined methodology, there are issues about transparency, 
consistency and fairness. According to the metric model, on the other hand, several dimensions of 
harms and benefits are defined beforehand and integrated in an explicit weighing scheme. This model, 
however, has the problem that it makes no real room for ethical deliberation of the sort committees 
undertake, and it has therefore been criticised for being too technocratic. Also, it is unclear who is to 
be held accountable for built-in ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two models are 
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not mutually exclusive and may be combined to make the most of their advantages while reducing 
the disadvantages of how harm benefit analysis is typically undertaken.  
 
Introduction  
The use of animals for research gives rise to a dilemma between the protection of the interests of the 
animals used and the promotion of the interests of those, mainly humans, benefitting from the 
research. To come to grips with this dilemma may in one respect be considered as an individual task 
in that the solution may depend on a moral outlook which can vary between individuals. One person 
may hold an anthropocentric view according to which human interests should always prevail, another 
person may hold an animal rights view according to which it is never right to impose harm on an 
animal to achieve benefits for humans, and a third person may hold a middle position that will allow 
the imposition of harms to animals if they give rise to proportionate human benefits. Research 
documents that there indeed are such differences in individual opinion1. Although individual opinions 
on the moral limits of the use of animals for experimentation differ widely, it remains necessary to 
find solutions to set standards governing what scientists are permitted to do when it comes to animal 
use. 
Such solutions have been implemented in different parts of the world through regulation – initially, 
mainly at the national level, but to an increasing extent through international initiatives including 
both formal measures, such as European Union (EU) legislation, and informal “soft law” norms 
governing the activities of international journals and the like. 
Regulation of animal experimentation cuts through some of the moral disagreement. It typically does 
so by setting up some conditions that must be satisfied before the use of animals for research is 
permitted. The main conditions pressed into service so far have been, firstly, that the use serves a 
socially acceptable purpose, and secondly, that all possible efforts have been made to comply with 
the 3Rs of Replacement, Reduction and Refinement. To oversee this, across all developed countries 
systems have been set up where potential users of animals must apply for a permit which is issued 
only if an evaluation (usually undertaken by a committee comprising different competences and 
perspectives)2 shows that the necessary conditions are met.  
Increasingly, a third condition has been discussed: the idea that research should only be allowed if 
the expected benefits of the research (the outcome in terms of knowledge, improved treatment options 
etc. that can reasonably be expected to be generated) exceed the predicted harm to the animals. The 
idea for a more systematic approach to this was originally developed in a seminal paper3 in which 
Patrick Bateson argued that harms imposed on animals must be proportionate to the scientific value 
of the experiment. Bateson introduced the decision cube as a way to work out the acceptable level of 
animal suffering in an experiment relative to the value it has to humans, where the latter is defined in 
the two dimensions of “importance of research” and “likelihood of benefit”. 
The need for harm-benefit analysis (HBA) of some kind was recognised when the first animal ethics 
committees were established by Swedish legislation in 19794 and this kind of calculation became part 
of the assessment regime introduced by the 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act in the UK. The 
concept of HBA is now more or less embedded as common practice globally5, and as an explicit 
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requirement in a series of regulatory documents across the world. In the Guide for the Care and Use 
of Laboratory Animals6, which regulates publicly funded research in the United States, committees 
are “obliged to weigh the objectives of the study against potential animal welfare concerns”. In their 
international accreditation of institutions, the assessment body AAALAC International requires that  
 
 
Figure 1. The Bateson cube for assessment of animal experiments4 (reprinted with permission from 
the Bateson family and Elsevier). 
 
committees “as part of the protocol review process, will weigh the potential adverse effects of the 
study against the potential benefits that are likely to accrue as a result of the research”7. Directive 
2010/63/EU, which forms the basis of the regulation of animal experimentation in all EU member 
states, requires that the project evaluation includes “a harm-benefit analysis of the project, to assess 
whether the harm to the animals in terms of suffering, pain and distress is justified by the expected 
outcome taking into account ethical considerations, and may ultimately benefit human beings, 
animals or the environment”8.  
Typically, the HBA requirement is understood to be part of the ethics review which, in most places, 
is undertaken by committees of experts, stakeholders and in some cases also lay people. These 
committees discuss and reflect on the value of particular projects, taking into account the harm done 
to animals. Their approach is based on what we will term the “discourse model”.  
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However, over recent years, a number of authors have proposed more specific methodologies which, 
making use of rigorous criteria that are usually based on algorithms or graphic representations, 
operationalise the HBA in what we will term “metric models”. Although metric models have never, 
as far as we know, been implemented in animal ethics review in practice, they have triggered a lively 
debate on how to carry out an effective and transparent harm-benefit analysis (e.g.9, 10-12). There also 
seems to be a growing interest in models which include a more rigorous method of HBA. Thus a 
recent US-European joint working group has proposed a model in which the different aspects of harm 
and benefit are colour-coded, with more intense colour indicating greater harm/benefit, as a way of 
producing an overview prior to the final assessment of ethical acceptability13.  
Judging by the debate so far, it is clear that while there is a perceived need for more rigorous methods 
of harm-benefit analysis, there is also scepticism among practitioners about the methods that have 
been proposed. In this paper, we aim to address the ideas underlying the discussion and 
disagreements. We will argue that in essence there are two very different suggestions about how to 
organise the HBA. One is the discourse model, which is based on a dynamic and relatively loosely 
structured discussion within a multidisciplinary group of people. The other is the metric model, which 
prescribes a detailed system for attributing value to harms and benefits and, on that basis, delivers 
clear positive or negative verdicts.  
In the next two sections, we outline the two models and ask how well each meets the different ideals 
of HBA. Against this background we turn, in the last section, to the question of what a satisfactory 
form of HBA would look like. We suggest it would need to combine elements from both models. 
 
HBA as an integral part of ethical review in committee: the discourse model  
The standard way of carrying out HBA has been set by the practice of ethics review committees. Here 
one of the elements included in Bateson’s model, “likelihood of benefit”, seems  to play no or a very 
limited role. Although the original paper by Bateson could be interpreted as proposing a simple metric 
that did not require dialogue and moral deliberation, a later paper14 makes it clear that this was not 
what Bateson had in mind. His view seems rather to be that the application of his ideas will require 
deliberation in a diverse group of people: a process where “a lot of fair-minded people, who often 
start with utterly different views, are finding ways of reaching agreement”14.  
The theoretical underpinnings of this approach are not terribly well worked out, but it is reasonable 
to assume that something like the following is the fundamental idea: by setting up committees on 
which not only experts, but also outsiders to animal experimentation such as representatives of animal 
protection groups and so-called lay members sit, it is possible to make room for dialogue where the 
committee members jointly, on behalf of society, draw boundaries around what is considered an 
acceptable research use of animals within the above-mentioned general framework. In other words, 
the public debate over the pros and cons of animal research is meant to crystallise in such committees.  
The legal scholar Katarina Alexius Borgström4 has presented evidence from official documents that 
the Swedish system, with its committees of equal numbers of people linked to animal experimentation 
and lay people, was indeed set up to allow deliberation across initially conflicting views and interests 
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so that decisions that could be viewed as genuinely joint decisions serving to balance different 
individual moral views are arrived at. 
This could, in turn, be underpinned by various forms of ethical or political thinking. That thinking 
could range from so-called procedural or discourse ethics15, according to which moral views should 
be validated through a social dialogue, across the view, found in the later works of John Rawls16, 
according to which moral disagreements in a social setting should, as far as possible, be decided by 
means of so-called overlapping consensus, and on to more pragmatic views favouring moral 
compromise17. 
In light of this, the methodological ideal for HBA could be summarised in something like the 
following way. It is always necessary to check first whether a project satisfies the requirements that 
it is being conducted for an appropriate purpose and that every practically possible effort has been 
made to apply the 3Rs. Also, the expected harm and benefit must be estimated. These tasks can be 
handled by legal or scientific experts. Following this, the committee in charge of reaching a verdict 
on whether a project should be accepted can engage in deliberation in terms of HBA. Here the 
committee will need to engage in a dialogue about whether the expected benefit is of a kind and size 
that can justify the anticipated harms to the laboratory animals. When doing this, the committee must, 
to ensure fairness in the assessment of other projects, have a view to a more general policy level – 
looking across projects and ideally also across committees who work within the same legal remits. 
This means that proper harm benefit assessment requires a double perspective including both the 
specific project and the precedent the verdict sets. The general idea is that, over time, committees will 
develop a nuanced picture of where to place the bar determining how much harm to laboratory 
animals is acceptable for the sake of achieving various forms of benefit. 
This account of the workings of HBA within the framework of ethics review in committees may be 
challenged on both theoretical and practical grounds. From a theoretical point of view, it can be 
argued that the idea of a sensible middle ground where disagreements about animal use can be argued 
out between fair-minded people who are not in the grip of “bigotry and fanaticism”14 is an attempt to 
impose a specific moral view on the whole of society. Those who favour an animal rights view 
according to which animal experimentation should be banned will claim that they are not irrational 
fanatics or bigots – they just appeal to reasons that differ from those accepted by the majority. Instead 
of beefing up the majority view as the product of an imaginary social compact, HBA could instead 
be described as a process allowing the majority moral view overruling the view of the minority. 
From another perspective, a system is only as good as it works in practice. How well the real 
functioning of committees deliberating over animal experiments corresponds to the imagined ideal 
has been addressed empirically in several studies. A common observation focuses on the influence 
of scientists and the associated concern that non-scientist voices are not heard. This imbalance may 
be a result of the sheer number of scientists. Studies of committee composition in both the US and 
Canada show that scientists are present in much greater numbers than any other group18, 19.  
Average contributions of scientific and non-scientific members of committees have also been shown 
to differ. Silverman and colleagues20 analysed the deliberations of 10 committees operating in top-
funded US biomedical research institutions. They found that the scientists contributed 50% more 
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comments than the community members – indeed, taking into account the higher total number of 
scientists, they calculated that overall scientists contributed nearly 10 times as much as community 
members to the discussion. Examining review procedures in three Canadian research institutions, 
Houde et al.21 found that discussion was dominated by the committee chair, the two committee 
members who were animal researchers and the veterinarian committee member. Only 33% of 
contributions were made by the remaining six members (non-animal researcher member, two 
technicians, lay member, administrative officer and student member). In interviews, Canadian 
committee members also commented on numerical representativeness, raising the “concern that 
community members would carry little weight in discussion because they were outnumbered by 
affiliated and mostly scientist members”18. Ideland22 argues that even in Sweden, where committees 
are composed with equal numbers of members from the scientific community and lay members, 
scientists have power over the agenda. Their expertise in science, which is both an important 
knowledge domain for the committee discussion and generally inaccessible to non-scientists, is likely 
to give them an advantage independently of whether they are in majority. Scientists can also come to 
dominate discussion by taking on certain roles. Silverman and colleagues20 investigated the 
relationship between the initial presentation of a protocol by a committee member and the subsequent 
committee discussion. The topics introduced by the presenter were found to be those which 
dominated the committee discussion. Given that the majority of presenters were scientists, this was 
considered an additional factor in the scientists’ domination of the discussion.  
Does an imbalance in committee composition and discussion affect the outcome of the reviews in 
general and the harm-benefit analysis in particular? The fact that most applications are in fact 
approved, at least after revision, has been interpreted as an approval bias resulting from committees 
where a large majority of members have a vested interest in research23, 24. Background also affects 
the types of comment different committee members make in the discussion. Silverman et al.20 found 
that community members were 1.7 times more likely than the scientists to discuss pain and distress. 
What do the committees actually discuss, and do they perform a harm-benefit analysis? In her 
interviews with 20 Swedish committee members, Ideland22 found that the majority of interviewees 
“agree that the animal ethics committees are discussing the ‘wrong’ questions” and do not engage in 
analysing harm versus benefit. A suggested explanation, in addition to the scientific discourse 
dominating the discussion, is that a technical discussion allows the committee to reach consensus, 
and that consensus would probably be unattainable for a harm-benefit analysis. Schuppli25 
interviewed 28 Canadian committee members and found that half of them did some kind of HBA, 
that they found it challenging, and that their approaches varied. Only a quarter of the interviewees 
generally required benefit to outweigh harms. Several highlighted the impossibility of conducting 
HBA because the benefits were too difficult to assess. Many added that there must be an upper limit 
for harms irrespective of benefits. 
A final important question concerns the consistency and potential standardisation of animal ethics 
review. Plous and Herzog26 studied 50 institutional committees in the US. Each committee provided 
recently assessed protocols for a second assessment by another committee. They found no significant 
relation between the first (original) and the second (experimental) recommendation. In the cases 
where the first and second reviews made different recommendations, the second committee was 
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nearly always more negative than the original review. The only aspect over which there was a strong 
correlation between the first and the second review was pain assessment, which was also the only 
aspect for which the committees were provided with a detailed scale with examples.  
The conclusion to be drawn, looking at the discourse model both from a theoretical and a practical 
perspective, is that there is a problem: there is lack of consistency across decisions taken by different 
committees, and it is difficult to ensure that common standards are applied in a transparent way. The 
metric models can clearly be seen as an answer to this problem. 
 
Metric models of HBA: quantifying ethical deliberation  
The promise of metric models is to facilitate the HBA and allow for a transparent, consistent and 
standardised decision-making process. In its most thoroughgoing version, the ideal is a methodology 
for HBA which can be used even without the help of a review committee. With information provided 
by the applicant, harms and benefits can be assigned and weighed using a predefined algorithm. 
The metrics model idea is not new: Canadian biomedical physicist David G. Porter was a first mover 
in this approach when publishing his “scoring system” in Nature in 199227. In this system eight 
domains are scored and aggregated: a) aim of experiment, b) realistic potential of experiment to 
achieve objective, c) species of animal, d) pain likely to be involved, e) duration of discomfort or 
distress, f) duration of experiment, g) number of animals, h) quality of animal care. In each domain a 
maximum of 5 points can be achieved. A low total score suggests that the project is less problematic 
than one with a higher total score. The idea of a scoring system using predefined criteria as a measure 
of HBA and applying cut-off scores has been taken up by a number of other scholars (e.g. 28-33) who 
have proposed different models based on essentially the same idea.  
The overall theoretical idea of capturing the complexity of HBA in a systematic tool is not entirely 
different from the ideal of the discourse model and the work of committees. In both cases, relevant 
criteria need to be identified, their degree of satisfaction has to be assessed, and a conclusion needs 
to be reached in which all factors are considered. However, whereas in the discourse model the 
components of HBA are often only implicit, HBA components must be explicitly identified and in 
place beforehand in metric models. The four most important components are the following: a) a 
defined set of criteria which comprise the harm and benefit dimensions to be included; b) the relative 
weights of the individual criteria; c) operational factors to identify and measure how well each 
criterion is fulfilled; d) a procedure that aggregates total harms and benefits into a final HBA outcome. 
If these four components can be adequately established, metric models will allow for a standardised 
and transparent weighing and decision-making process. This in turn will enable consistent standards 
to be applied across projects. It will also allow  applicants to know beforehand which criteria are of 
relevance and what kinds of information have to be provided for the HBA to be carried out in the 
project application. By applying the same metric methodology as the authority, an applicant would 
know in advance whether the HBA is likely to result in a positive or negative outcome. Potentially, 
it seems, the metric methodology would contribute massively to transparency, reduce identified 
inconsistencies in the evaluation process34, lead to greater harmonisation at the national and 
international level, and improve efficiency.  
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Thus, in its ideal version, the metric model seems very promising. However as already mentioned, 
criticisms have been made of various aspects of previously proposed models (for an overview cf. 9, 
10), and the overall idea of metric HBA faces a number of theoretical and practical challenges. 
The primary theoretical challenge lies in how best to capture ethical deliberation in a metric model. 
Brønstad and co-authors9 claim that “moral dilemmas cannot/shall not be solved by arithmetics.” 
Essentially, the point here made is that a measuring and weighing system eliminates responsible 
deliberation and judgement, an issue also raised by e.g. Bout et al.35. 
  
 
  
 
Figure 2. Components of the metric harm–benefit analysis (HBA) that systematically guide 
application and evaluation. 
 
Although it is true that if applied as the only evaluation instrument, the metric model replaces practical 
deliberation in dialogue, it is not true that ethical thinking does not play a role in metric models. The 
ethical thinking takes place, not when the evaluation instrument is used, but when it is being 
developed. Numerous ethical and legal judgements are needed to assess whether particular factors 
are of relevance, and to attach suitable weightings to these factors, and these need to be integrated as 
criteria in the resulting standardised metric model. 
However, the fact that ethical judgements are made primarily in the development of the model and 
not in its application is problematic in several ways. One is the question of accountability. Project 
evaluation decisions have legal implications – the evaluation is a mechanism used to implement the 
legislation that regulates the use of animals in experiments (e.g. 2). As such, somebody needs to be 
accountable for the resulting decisions. When they are the outcome of ethical reasoning by a 
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committee that has the mandate to deliberate over project applications, accountability lies with that 
committee. But with a metric model, ethical judgements are made when criteria are defined and 
weighted in the development of the method. It is much less clear who is accountable for decisions 
that are the outcome of predefined metrics. The assumptions that go into these metrics are in many 
cases not spelled out – and more importantly, they are not deliberated upon and accepted by those 
who have a mandate to do so. 
The accountability issue can be dealt with in part by ensuring that deliberation takes place in the 
model development and is done by people who are mandated by society to do so. This could be 
through a participatory process where stakeholders (applicants, competent authorities, industry, 
animal protection groups, 3R specialists) are represented and agree on the criteria, their relative 
weight, the factors identifying the degree of fulfilment, and the algorithm. However, such 
participatory processes are highly demanding and, against a background of polarized debate over 
animal use, at risk of failure.  
Indeed, experience from an Austrian project36 supports the worry that participatory processes will not 
lead to consensus. The aim of this project was to develop a standardised method for the evaluation of 
animal research proposals, and HBA in particular, on the basis of objective criteria. The resulting 
method was supposed to be used in their project evaluations by the competent authorities without the 
help of an ethics committee. Hence, the aim was to develop an algorithm which generates the result 
of the HBA on the basis of information provided by the applicant “automatically.” Further, the 
intention was to develop and evaluate the method in a participatory process that included stakeholders 
from the industry, representatives of science and research institutions, the relevant authorities, 
representatives from NGOs and 3R specialists. However, in none of the above-mentioned four basic 
components of HBA did the Austrian project reach consensus among stakeholders and experts 
groups. An important source of disagreement was the idea that a single set of criteria could be applied 
across all fields of research. The project showed that attempts to press the complexity of the various 
research fields into a single set of predefined criteria are unlikely to find shared support.  
In addition to the challenges inherent in reaching consensus over a politically charged issue, the HBA 
method also needs to overcome a difficult methodological issue. Since the algorithm in a metric 
model has to accommodate weightings of different value dimensions and reduce them to one 
“currency”, easy solutions for the weighing procedure are not very likely32, 36. The problem of adding 
up “apples and oranges” comes to the fore in metric methodologies12. 
A second methodological problem has to do with the complex and varying nature of projects. 
Contextual factors which only become evident as one is looking at a particular research project can 
be handled in case-by-case deliberation in a more dynamic system. In contrast, a universal 
methodology, applicable across all of the different kinds of project that may have to be evaluated in 
a given country, means that every possible scenario and problem has to be anticipated and dealt with 
at the design and development stage. This is unlikely to be successful. Instead a “one size fits all” 
approach will be forced upon projects for which it is not necessarily well suited.  
A concrete example mentioned by a number of authors is that existing models bias HBA in favour of 
applied research (e.g. 37-42) by asking for expected benefits to be measured in concrete quantitative 
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terms such as number of patients affected. Indeed, the uncertainties connected with the prospective 
assessment of expected benefits are a major concern for this kind of evaluation43. With good reason, 
Brønstad and colleagues categorise benefits as “future promise” which may never be realised9 – a 
categorisation suggesting that the ambition of quantifying expected benefits through any kind of 
numeric measure is questionable.  
Innumerable scenarios and issues can be imagined which tend to confirm that the outcome of a project 
(knowledge) might not be turned into quantifiable benefit39. An ethics review committee with a 
mandate to assess expected harm and benefit can, and has to, deal with such scenarios and issues. In 
the metric model the issues become a problem, since they have to be predefined in terms of 
operational factors. 
The metric model has been criticised for its commitment to the idea of a clear-cut methodology in a 
field where clear-cut solutions are considered inappropriate or illusory5, 29, 44, 45. The need for explicit 
deliberation and the ability to consider contextual factors are consistent with these criticisms. The 
problems, both of accountability and the lack of consideration of project-specific contextual factors, 
are aggravated if the metric is applied wholly outside the context of wider ethics review by committee. 
Although in practice this happens only rarely, it is in fact how HBA was intended to function in the 
evaluation of animal experimentation in Austria36. 
In summary, the metric methodologies promise a structured, transparent and standardised process of 
HBA. But although they provide a shared basis for weighing harms and benefits for applicants and 
the authority alike, their severe problems on the theoretical and practical level make it unlikely that a 
thoroughgoing metric model will make good on its promises if it is applied without additional support 
in a project evaluation. 
 
How to achieve the added value of HBA? Combining the two models  
The last two sections described and analysed important aspects of the two main methods of HBA in 
ethical review of animal experiments. The ideas behind, and the attractions and shortcomings of, the 
two models were explained. At present only the discourse method is used. Social science studies were 
summarised in an effort to understand how the ideals of HBA are secured with that method in practice. 
An overview of the ideals and challenges connected with each of the two methods is presented in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Overview of the ideals and the challenges of the discourse and metric models of harm-benefit analysis 
 Discourse Model Metric model 
Ideals 
 
§ Ethical judgements should be validated through a social dialogue  
§ Disagreements about animal experimentation can be argued out between fair-
minded people 
§ Committees over time develop standards for acceptable harm-benefit balance 
§ Transparency of criteria and consistent weighing  
§ Standardisation and harmonisation across projects, and evaluation 
procedures applied nationally and internationally  
§ Clear-cut predictable decision-making 
Challenges   
Accountability As ethical judgements take place within committee deliberation over individual 
projects => accountability for a decision lies with the committee who makes it 
As ethical judgement takes place when criteria are defined and weighted in the 
development of the method => unclear who is accountable for decisions 
made which are the outcome of predefined metrics 
Developing and 
operating the 
method 
To establish a method that allows the ideal to be met it is necessary to find a 
way to structure the discussion that allows all voices to be heard, that keeps a 
relevant focus, and that operates in a consistent manner 
 
In practice: 
§ A thoroughly developed methodology is often missing 
§ Social and professional roles strongly influence the deliberation and the 
composition of committees shapes the outcome 
§ Unguided discussion results in focus on issues other than HBA 
§ Limitations in the standardisation of procedure and outcome 
§ Non-transparent criteria 
To establish a method that allows the ideal to be met it is necessary to work 
out the complete and complex framework for a metric HBA: 
§ defining a set of criteria covering the harm and benefit dimensions; 
§ identifying the relative weights of individual criteria; 
§ finding operational factors to measure how well criteria are fulfilled;  
§ formulating a procedure that computes total harms and benefits and 
generates a final outcome 
In practice: 
§ Unlikely to achieve consensus of stakeholders and experts on the 
composition of the methodology  
Dealing with 
the diversity of 
projects 
§ Contextual factors can be can be handled in case-by-case deliberation  § “One size fits all mentality” of the particular metric underestimates the 
complexity and diversity of projects 
§ Risk of biased results and inappropriate outcomes of the HBA if a single 
predefined metric is applied to all types of project 
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It seems obvious that both models have merit, but face challenges, and that exclusive application of 
either one of them is unlikely to offer an ideal solution. In the following we will therefore discuss 
possible compromises. However, let us first take a step back and ask to what extent HBA is a 
significant addition to the project evaluation process.  
Against the backdrop of what has been said, the following five observations help to put the added 
value of HBA in perspective. First, in whatever form, HBA raises awareness that reducing harm and 
applying the 3Rs in animal research is no longer sufficient. Focus on the benefit dimension marks a 
change in the mind-set around animal research. Second, the demand that we balance harm to animals 
and benefits to others, primarily human beings, emphasises that animals have to be considered in a 
significant way. Third, HBA has given rise to valuable discussions about how decisions are taken in 
review committees and a call for transparency in approval procedures. Fourth, and connecting with 
transparency, HBA helps to underline the need for consistency across projects, committees and 
countries, which is of crucial importance for harmonisation. Fifthly, the idea that applicants should 
receive fair treatment (in among other things legal terms), and that at the same time the needs of 
research animals should be given fair consideration, is preserved in HBA.  
Hence, potentially, there is significant added value to be had by incorporating HBA into the review 
process. The question is whether the unresolved challenges facing the discourse model and the 
metrics model can be overcome by combining them. 
The core idea of the metric model is promising: applicants and the authorities work on the basis of a 
shared set of criteria which operationalise the harm and benefit dimension of particular experiments 
(Fig. 2). An explicit set of criteria allows not only for more transparency, consistency and fairness, 
but also for improved efficiency in the authorisation procedures of committees. Information on 
relevant criteria could easily be provided for the applicants and be picked up by committee members 
and authorities. Further, explicit criteria could facilitate a uniform development across committees 
and countries. The results on the various harm and benefit dimensions can be documented 
transparently, and step-by-step, in a way that facilitates retrospective analysis and allows committees 
to monitor their standards.  
Of course, a set of criteria does not fully answer the question of how to weigh harms and benefits. In 
this regard a procedural approach in which solutions are located in a social dialogue, as is the ideal 
of the discourse model, can be used as a guiding idea. As we have seen, for various reasons it is not 
very likely that agreement on a particular algorithm (metric model) will be achieved prospectively. 
However, for a decision to be reached in committees, weighing has to take place anyhow (implicitly 
or explicitly) in one way or another. 
The results of reviews undertaken in committees could be used to retrospectively learn about, and 
reflect on, plausible weightings and weighing strategies to be aligned with the given legal framework. 
This approach would make it possible to apply context-sensitive weighing procedures step-by-step. 
Prospectively, they could serve as starting points in committees.  
In terms of methodological challenges, a merger of the two models could overcome the shortcomings 
of the discourse model – shortcomings seen predominantly in a bias towards science resulting from 
committee composition in combination with unstructured, inconsistent and non-transparent 
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procedures. An explicit set of criteria would focus and direct the work of review committees and help 
to avoid a bias, in their discussions, towards the values of committee members in dominant roles. 
Uncertainties will, of course, remain when harms and benefits are assessed prospectively. However, 
the committee would be mandated to decide or advise in conditions of uncertainty. 
The combination of the two models would facilitate transparent dealing with uncertainty and a 
standardised documentation of the decision-making process. On a practical level, the merger would 
allow room for flexibility within a transparent framework. Since a “one size fits all” metric model 
with a predefined algorithm seems to be too ambitious, or even misconceived, the development of 
criteria which guide committees through the HBA and allow for reflection and debate seems 
desirable. This methodology ought to enable important aspects of HBA to be operationalised within 
a given framework without an agreed metric. The criticism of metric models over their inflexibility 
can be avoided, and the complexity of “non-standard” projects can be taken into account. 
Therefore, we suggest that a combination of the two models offers the most promising way forward. 
When HBA is built on the strengths of the metric model, transparent, consistent, fair and efficient 
approval processes are attainable. The risk that the discourse model will be used as a smoke screen is 
also avoided and its strengths maintained. It allows for flexibility, contextual sensitivity, and the 
integration of expert knowledge. In practice, the final decision will be based on a dialogue in light of 
comprehensive input delivered by the metric model relating to criteria which comprise the harm and 
benefit dimensions.  In sum, we believe that the full added value of HBA can be realised, if applicants, 
authorities and review committees work on the basis of explicit and transparent criteria that allow for 
fair-minded dialogue and transparent decisions. 
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